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A series of recent studies have utilized the two-to-onemapping paradigm in the Stroop task.
In this paradigm, the word red might be presented in blue when both red and blue share
the same-response key (same-response trials). This manipulation has been used to show
the separate contributions of (within) semantic category conﬂict and response conﬂict to
Stroop interference. Such results evidencing semantic category conﬂict are incompatible
with models of the Stroop task that are based on response conﬂict only. However, the
nature of same-response trials is unclear since they are also likely to involve response
facilitation given that both dimensions of the stimulus provide evidence toward the same-
response. In this study we explored this possibility by comparing them with three other trial
types. We report strong (Bayesian) evidence for no statistical difference between same-
response and non-color word neutral trials, faster responses to same-response trials than
to non-response set incongruent trials, and no differences between same-response vs.
congruent trials when contingency is controlled. Our results suggest that same-response
trials are not different from neutral trials indicating that they cannot be used reliably to
determine the presence or absence of semantic category conﬂict. In light of these results,
the interpretation of a series of recent studies might have to be reassessed.
Keywords: Stroop, semantic, conflict, same-response, non-response
INTRODUCTION
The classic Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) requires participants to
respond as quickly and as accurately as possible to the color
in which a word is printed whilst ignoring the word’s mean-
ing. The Stroop congruency effect refers to the slower response
times (RTs) on incongruent trials (e.g., the word “red” printed
in blue) compared to congruent trials (e.g., the word “red”
printed in red). This effect has been attributed to having to
resolve conﬂict at the response stage when the color and the
meaning of the word each activate different-responses (referred
to as response conﬂict or stimulus-response conﬂict, Cohen
et al., 1990; MacLeod, 1991; Roelofs, 2003). However, some
researchers have posited that in addition to interference/conﬂict
resolution at the response stage, performance in the Stroop task
also requires conﬂict resolution in earlier processing stages (e.g.,
Klein, 1964; Sharma and McKenna, 1998; Zhang and Korn-
blum, 1998; Zhang et al., 1999; De Houwer, 2003; Schmidt
and Cheesman, 2005). For example, semantic category con-
ﬂict (an example of stimulus-stimulus conﬂict, or conﬂict that
arises during stimulus processing independently of response pro-
cesses) refers to when both dimensions of the stimulus elicit
two different items from the same semantic category and thus
produce within-category competition. In the case of a typical
Stroop task, both the word and color dimensions activate color
concepts which results in competition at the semantic category
level of “colors”. It should be noted that studies in the litera-
ture typically use the general term “semantic conﬂict” while the
current research deﬁnes semantic category conﬂict as its main
source.
In an effort to distinguish response conﬂict and semantic
category conﬂict researchers (De Houwer, 2003; Schmidt and
Cheesman, 2005; van Veen and Carter, 2005; Steinhauser and
Hubner, 2009) have used a variation of the Stroop task ﬁrst intro-
duced in De Houwer (2003) that maps two color responses to
one response button. Typically in studies employing the Stroop
task, each response is assigned to a particular key on the key-
board or response box. This ensures that when an incongruent
word is presented (e.g., “red” in blue) the font color and word
will contribute evidence toward different-response keys (i.e., “red”
will be assigned to the “z” on the keyboard and “blue” will be
assigned to the “m” key), ensuring competition at the response
output level. It is possible, however, to assign both “red” and
“blue” to the “z” key. When the incongruent word red is presented
in blue both dimensions of the Stroop stimulus contribute evi-
dence toward the same-response keys, but still activate different
color concepts. This two-to-one paradigm enables a distinction
between two types of incongruent trials determined by whether
the relevant and irrelevant stimuli share a common response.
We will refer to these incongruent trials as different-response
and same-response trials, respectively. Same-response trials are
thought to involve semantic category conﬂict but not response
conﬂict (since both “red” and “blue” share a common response)
while different-response trials involve both semantic and response
conﬂict.
This paradigm has been used to differentiate semantic and
response based conﬂict. Comparing different-response trials to
same-response trials is thought to yield a puremeasure of response
conﬂict, while comparing same-response trials to congruent trials
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is thought to measure semantic category (or sometimes called
stimulus-stimulus) conﬂict (De Houwer, 2003; Schmidt and
Cheesman, 2005; van Veen and Carter, 2005; Steinhauser and
Hubner, 2009). Since congruent trials are also trials on which
both dimensions of the stimulus contribute evidence toward
the same-response, but also contribute evidence toward the
same semantic item, it is assumed that the difference between
the two conditions is semantic category conﬂict. In short,
same-response trials are semantic category-incompatible but
response-compatible, different-response trials are both semantic
category-incompatible and response-incompatible and congru-
ent trials are both semantic category compatible and response-
compatible.
Schmidt andCheesman (2005) observed a 24ms semantic cate-
gory conﬂict effect and a 32 ms response conﬂict effect. In an fMRI
study, van Veen and Carter (2005) compared brain activity asso-
ciated with response and semantic conﬂict and showed that each
activated unique brain areas. They found that the contrast between
same-response and congruent trials, reﬂecting semantic category
conﬂict, did not overlap with the contrast between different-
response and same-response trials. This was taken as evidence
for the two types of conﬂict being detected and resolved by dis-
tinct regions of the brain. Using ex-Gaussian distribution analysis,
Steinhauser and Hubner (2009) used same-response trials to get a
purer measure of response conﬂict and observed response conﬂict
in the Gaussian component of the distribution while task conﬂict
(a form of semantic based conﬂict) was observed in the expo-
nential component. Highlighting its utility, other recent studies
have also employed the paradigm or similar two-to-one mapping
paradigms (Wendt et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2011, 2013; Berggren
and Derakshan, 2014).
In sum, in the present literature there is a debate as to whether
semantic processes contribute to Stroop effects. Same-response
trials have been used to provide evidence for the inﬂuences of
semantic processes in the Stroop task, particularly semantic cate-
gory conﬂict. According to some models such conﬂict should not
exist since according to these models all interference in Stroop-
like tasks is attributable to response conﬂict (Cohen et al., 1990;
Roelofs, 2003). In light of the uptake of this paradigm, and
the theoretical ramiﬁcations of the presence of semantic cate-
gory conﬂict, the present study sought to assess whether one
can measure the contribution of semantic category conﬂict to
Stroop effects using same-response trials. In Experiment 1 we
aimed to replicate the semantic category conﬂict effect observed
in previous studies. In Experiment 2, participants completed two
counterbalanced blocks of the Stroop task. In one block, consis-
tent with previous studies and Experiment 1, participants were
exposed to congruent, same-response and different-response tri-
als. In this block, non-color word neutral trials (e.g., “stage”
in blue) were also included. In the other block, the congru-
ent stimuli were replaced with non-response set incongruent
stimuli (i.e., stimuli in which the word dimension is a color
word that is not one of the possible response colors, e.g., “pur-
ple” in red). Furthermore, in both blocks we controlled for
response contingency (Schmidt et al., 2007; Schmidt and Besner,
2008). We explain the motivation for each of these modiﬁcations
below.
INCLUSION OF NON-COLOR WORD NEUTRAL TRIALS
There is a potential issue with calculating semantic category con-
ﬂict by comparing same-response trials to congruent trials as all
previous studies have done. This is because, whilst congruent and
same-response trials could involve response facilitation because
the color concepts from both dimensions in each case provide evi-
dence toward the same-response, congruent trials likely involve
a unique semantic facilitation effect (Brown, 2011) which would
result in faster RTs. Thus, this might not make them a suitable
baseline to isolate semantic conﬂict since any difference in RT
between the two trial types could be due in part to the presence of
semantic facilitation. In order to remove the inﬂuence of semantic
facilitation, Experiment 2A included non-color word neutral trials
which do not involve semantic or response facilitation or semantic
or response conﬂict. Slower RTs on same-response trials compared
to neutral trials would be supportive evidence of semantic cate-
gory conﬂict, as is predicted by multiple-stage accounts (Klein,
1964; Zhang and Kornblum, 1998; De Houwer, 2003; Schmidt
and Cheesman, 2005; Zhang et al., 1999). Should same-response
trials be faster than neutral trials it would be evidence for an
effect of response facilitation on same-response trials, not solely
semantic conﬂict as has previously been assumed. Moreover, it
would mean that studies comparing same-response and different-
response trials for a purer measure of response conﬂict would also
have to be reassessed. Importantly, even evidence for no differ-
ence between the trial types would be meaningful since it would
indicate that same-response trials should not be used to infer the
presence or absence of semantic category (or stimulus–stimulus)
conﬂict.
INCLUSION OF NON-RESPONSE SET INCONGRUENT TRIALS
Non-response set incongruent trials (e.g.,“purple”printed in blue,
when the color purple is not used on any trial) involve seman-
tic category competition but no semantic facilitation, since both
dimensions of the Stroop stimulus activate different color con-
cepts, but little or no response competition (Klein, 1964; Sugg
and McDonald, 1994) and response facilitation because the word
dimension is not a possible response. If responses to same-
response trials are faster than those to non-response set trials it
would provide support for the existence of response facilitation on
the former. Moreover, since non-response set trials do not include
response facilitation, the comparison between these trials and neu-
tral trials might give a better measure of semantic category conﬂict
than same-response trials. Finally, the comparison between non-
response set trials and different-response trials might provide a
purer measure of response competition.
CONTROLLING FOR RESPONSE CONTINGENCY
Recent work has shown effects of contingency on congruent trial
RTs (Schmidt et al., 2007; Schmidt and Besner, 2008). The con-
tingency effect shows that the associations between word and
response are implicitly learnt throughout an experiment and used
to predict speciﬁc responses to each word, which facilitates RTs
to trials where the correct response is highly correlated to the
word. This is the case with congruent trials since they often make
up half the trials. For example, with a four response Stroop task
there are only four possible word-color combinations to create
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the congruent stimuli whereas there are a possible 12 word-color
combinations when creating incongruent stimuli. This means
that the words are more often associated with their congruent
color counterparts. When contingency is absent, RTs to congru-
ent trials increase (see Schmidt et al., 2007; Schmidt and Besner,
2008). Although not explicit, contingency has been controlled in
some studies employing same-response trials (De Houwer, 2003;
Schmidt and Cheesman, 2005), whilst it was not controlled in oth-
ers (van Veen and Carter, 2005; Steinhauser and Hubner, 2009).
Importantly for present purposes, contingency is also likely to
affect same-response trials. Since Experiment 2A involved congru-
ent trials, we controlled for contingency by having twice as many
different-response trials than congruent and same-response tri-
als, which ensures that for each color word, the probability of any
of the responses being the correct response is be equal. Thus, any
difference remaining between same-response/congruent trials and
other trials types would therefore represent inﬂuences attributable
to other factors.
SUMMARY
Thus the main goal of the current research was to determine
whether same-response trials truly index semantic category con-
ﬂict by addressing possible inﬂuences of semantic and response
facilitation whilst controlling for contingency. The critical com-
parisons in the experiment were as follows: (1) Same-response
trials vs. neutral trials: the difference between these trials would
be a more accurate measure of semantic category competition
since neutral trials involve neither response facilitation nor seman-
tic category conﬂict; (2) Same-response trials vs. non-response
set trials: the comparison of these trials would also inform
us whether there is facilitation involved when processing the
former as an inhibition only based account of same-response
trials predicts no difference between the two, while one that
includes a response facilitation component would predict faster
responses to same-response trials; (3) Same-response trials vs.
congruent trials when contingency is controlled: If contingency
does have an effect, we would expect the difference between
the two conditions to be smaller when it has been controlled
for; (4) Same-response trials vs. different-response trials when
contingency is controlled: If contingency is affecting RTs to same-
response trials the difference observed between these two trial
types in some previous studies is likely to overestimate response
competition.
Before reporting the key experiment of the paper (Experi-
ment 2), we ﬁrst report a replication (Experiment 1) of the
two-to-one mapping paradigm as it has been most commonly
employed: Including different-response, same-response and con-
gruent trials but without neutral and non-response set trials and
without controlling for contingency. To foreshadow the ﬁndings
of this paper, using Bayesian statistics we provide evidence for
no difference between neutral and same-response trials suggest-
ing that studies utilizing same-response trials to measure semantic
category conﬂict or response conﬂict will have to be reassessed.
Experiment 1 is reported to establish the magnitude of the
effects under present conditions and for later use in the calculation
of Bayes Factors where we test whether any null effects observed
are evidence for the absence of an effect or the absence of evidence
FIGURE 1 | Mean response times (RTs; in ms) for each condition in
Experiment 1. Error bars represent SE.
FIGURE 2 | Mean RTs (in ms) for each condition in Experiment 2A.
Error bars represent SE.
for an effect and was not run as a within-subjects manipulation
with Experiment 2 to avoid learned contingencies carrying over.
Experiment 2 consisted of two counterbalanced blocks of trials
in which contingency was controlled. In one block, only neu-
tral, same-response, congruent and different-response trials were
included (Experiment 2A). The other block was the same except
that the congruent trials were replaced by non-response set trials
(Experiment 2B).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Two different groups of 36 students (12 male in Experiment 1, 6 in
Experiment 2) participated in each of the experiments in exchange
for course credit or £5. The average age was 24.7 (SD = 6.4) for
Experiment 1 and 21.0 (SD = 5.0) for Experiment 2.
APPARATUS AND MATERIALS
Stimuli were presented using standard PC running Experiment
Builder software (SRResearch Ltd, 2010) and responsesweremade
via a standard chiclet keyboard with colored stickers on the corre-
sponding response keys. In Experiment 1, the colors blue (RGB: 0;
www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1157 | 3
Hasshim and Parris Same-response Stroop stimuli
FIGURE 3 | Mean RTs (in ms) for each condition in Experiment 2B. Error
bars represent SE.
112; 192) and green (RGB: 0; 255; 0) were assigned “c” key while
red (RGB: 255; 0; 0) and yellow (RGB: 255; 255; 0) the “m” key.
For Experiment 2 the neutral words used were DUE, WALL,
STORY, and MARVEL. In addition to the colors used in Exper-
iment 1, the colors orange (RGB: 255; 127; 0), pink (RGB:
255; 20; 147), purple (RGB: 0; 125; 255), and white (RGB:
255; 255; 255) were used. For each participant, four of the
colors were used as responses while the other four were used
as the word dimension in the non-response trials. The colors
that were assigned as responses and distractors were counter-
balanced as was which colors were mapped on to the response
keys and the order of which participants performed Experi-
ments 2A,B. Words in each condition had been matched for
frequency and length using the English Lexicon Project (Balota
et al., 2007). Each word was presented in the four response
colors equally often. The words were presented in lowercase,
bold, and in size 20 Courier New font on a black back-
ground.
PROCEDURE
Oneach trial, participantswere presentedwith a gray ﬁxation cross
in the center of the screen for 500ms followed by the Stroop stimu-
lus which remained on the screen until a response was made. They
were instructed to press the assigned key corresponding to the
color of the text as quickly as possible whilst ignoring the meaning
of the word. An auditory feedback tone was given when an error
was made. Participants went through a practice block of 48 trials.
Before the experiment participants were given instructions ver-
bally and written instructions were presented on the screen before
each block commenced.
In Experiment 1, participants went through four blocks of 72
trials, resulting in 96 experimental trials in each condition in total.
Each block contained an equal number of trials from the three
conditions (congruent, same-response, and different-response)
presented in random order.
In Experiment 2A, participants went through three blocks of
80 trials, which consisted of 48 trials each of the congruent, same-
response, and neutral conditions and 96 trials of the different-
response condition. Having twice asmany different-response trials
is necessary to control for contingency by ensuring that the correct
response to each word presented is equal for the two response
buttons.
In Experiment 2B, participants went through three blocks of
64 trials which consisted of 48 trials each of the same-response,
different-response, neutral, and non-response trials. It was not
necessary to have different number of trials of each trial type as
congruent trials were not presented.
RESULTS
EXPERIMENT 1
Incorrect responses (5.2% across all conditions) were excluded
from the analyses alongwith responses thatwere faster than 200ms
and slower than 2500 ms. This resulted in the total proportion of
valid responses to be 94.6%.
We conducted a one-way repeated measures analysis of
variance (ANOVA) to determine whether there were differ-
ences in RTs to the congruent, same-response and different-
response conditions. The difference across the three groups
was signiﬁcant [F(2,70) = 31.32, p < 0.001, r = 0.56].
A priori follow-up tests revealed that RTs for the congruent
condition (M = 571.53 ms, SE = 20.68) were signiﬁcantly
faster than those on same-response trials [M = 601.56 ms,
SE = 23.69; t(35) = 4.42, p < 0.001, r = 0.60] and
different-response trials [M = 626.54 ms, SE = 25.34;
t(35) = 7.15, p < 0.001, r = 0.77] while the same-
response condition was faster than the different-response con-
dition [t(35) = 3.95, p < 0.001, r = 0.56]. Impor-
tantly, these results replicate the ﬁndings from previ-
ous studies showing a semantic category conﬂict effect
(see Figure 1).
The omnibusANOVA for error rates across the three conditions
was statistically signiﬁcant [F(2,70) = 12.85, p< 0.001, r = 0.39].
Follow-up pairwise comparisons showed that the error rate in
the different condition (6.8%) was signiﬁcantly more than the
same-response [4.4%; t(35) = 3.87, p < 0.001, r = 0.54] and
congruent [4.5%; t(35) = 4.03, p < 0.001, r = 0.56] conditions.
The error rates between same-response and congruent trials were
non-signiﬁcantly different [t(35) = 0.378, p = 0.708, r = 0.06].
EXPERIMENT 2A
The same exclusion criteria as Experiment 1 were used which
resulted in the proportion of valid responses to be 95.5%. A one-
way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted and was found to
be statistically signiﬁcant [F(3,105) = 8.72, p < 0.001, r = 0.23;
see Figure 2]. In the introduction a set of critical comparisons
were outlined. Data from this block permit us to test critical
comparisons 1, 3, and 4.
No difference was observed between same-response (M = 602.
35 ms, SE = 17.40) and neutral (M = 601.55 ms, SE = 13.75)
trials [t(35) = 0.089, p = 0.929, r = 0.015]. To determine if
there was evidence for no difference between the two condi-
tions, we used a Bayes Factor (Dienes, 2011), where we contrasted
the theory that there was a difference between the two condi-
tions with the null hypothesis that there was no difference (0.33
and below being the cut off for strong evidence for the null; a
Bayes Factor of 3 or above can be taken as strong evidence for
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a difference). To calculate the Bayes Factor we used 6–45 ms as
the range and assumed a uniform distribution (i.e., all values
within this range were equally likely). This range was chosen
based on previous work in our and other labs (De Houwer,
2003; Schmidt and Cheesman, 2005; van Veen and Carter, 2005;
Chen et al., 2011, 2013; Parris et al., 2012a,b, 2013; Parris and
Dienes, 2013) considering the theory under test (i.e., that seman-
tic category conﬂict exists/is measurable using same-response
trials).1 For the difference between neutral and same-response
trials a Bayes Factors of 0.17 was returned, providing strong
evidence for the null hypothesis of no difference relative to the
alternative hypothesis. In other words the observed mean differ-
ence and SE of the difference between the same-response and
neutral trials were sufﬁciently far from the expected range to
be considered evidence for the null. This ﬁnding is important
and suggests that, at least when using RT as the dependent
variable, same-response trials do not index semantic category
competition.
For critical comparison 3 we calculated a Bayes Factor for the
difference between congruent (M = 601.54 ms, SE = 15.90) and
same-response (M = 602.35 ms, SE = 17.40) trials [t(35) = 0.095,
p = 0.925, r = 0.016]. Again we assumed a uniform distribu-
tion with all values between 6 and 45 ms being equally likely.
This yielded a Bayes Factor of 0.15 providing strong evidence for
no difference between the two conditions. This ﬁnding contrasts
with previous studies showing a semantic category conﬂict effect
when contingency is controlled (De Houwer, 2003; Schmidt and
Cheesman, 2005).
For critical comparison 4 we compared same-response
(M = 602.35 ms, SE = 17.40) trials and different-response
(M = 633.31 ms, SE = 15.7) trials when contingency was
controlled. As in Experiment 1 here we observed a signiﬁcant
difference between the two conditions [t(35) = 4.54, p < 0.001,
r = 0.61].
Although not one of the stated critical comparisons the large
apparent effect of contingency on congruent trial RTs was sur-
prising enough to motivate a comparison between the congruent
and neutral trials. It was stated that faster RTs on congruent vs.
neutral trials would be attributed to facilitation that remains after
contingency is controlled, but there was no statistical difference
1To calculate a Bayes factor one must ﬁrst consider the expected magnitude of
the effect under investigation. Schmidt and Cheesman (2005) used experimental
methods that most closely resemble the present study and observed a semantic
category conﬂict effect of 24 ms when using congruent trials as the baseline. The
size of this effect is comparable, but is at the lower end of the 24–45 ms range
observed in other studies using two-to-one mapping in Stroop task (However, the
larger value was in a study that presented word primes prior to the Stroop stimuli
which may have encouraged greater word processing and thus greater facilitation
(Parris et al., 2013). The remaining values range between 15 and 27 ms. If 15 ms,
then of the 31.6 ms average raw effect size for the same-response vs. congruent
trial comparison we might expect 15 ms to be facilitation (neutral-congruent) and
16.6 ms semantic category interference; in other words the RT for neutral trials falls
roughly half-way between congruent and same-response trials. If 27 ms then we
might expect only 3 ms interference. We would certainly not expect the difference
between same-response and neutral trials to be greater than the 45 ms maximal
difference observed between same-response and congruent trials so we set 45 ms
as the upper bound of expected range. To set the lower bound we must consider
the smallest raw effect size that would be theoretically interesting. Notably harder
to deﬁne we selected 6 ms since this is the raw effect size of a recent study using the
Stroop task that was theoretically meaningful (Risko et al., 2006).
between the congruent and neutral trial RTs (p > 0.05) in this
study. We modeled the predictions of the theory of a difference
with a uniform between 0 and 30 ms, i.e., any effect was as plau-
sible as any other in the full range (encompassing the 15–27 ms
range suggested by the previous work alluded to above). The dif-
ference between the congruent (M = 601.54 ms, SE = 15.90) and
neutral (M = 601.55 ms, SE = 13.75) conditions showed a Bayes
Factor of 0.29. This result suggests that once contingency is con-
trolled there remains no facilitation effect when using a non-word
neutral trial as the baseline. As far as we are aware, this is the ﬁrst
report of this ﬁnding, and one that suggests that debates over the
mechanisms behind facilitation (MacLeod and MacDonald, 2000;
Kane and Engle, 2003; Brown, 2011; Roelofs, 2010) should ﬁrst
consider contingency.
Importantly however, this result also serves another purpose,
helping us to interpret the null difference between same-response
and congruent trials. This will be discussed later.
The error rates for the congruent, neutral, same-response and
different-response were 4.6, 4.3, 3.2, and 4.7% respectively. Anal-
ysis of the error rates showed a non-signiﬁcant difference in the
omnibus one-way ANOVA [F(3,105) = 2.40, p = 0.072, r = 0.15].
EXPERIMENT 2B
Using the same exclusion criteria as the other two experiments, the
proportion of valid responses in this experiment was 94.47%. The
repeatedmeasures one-wayANOVAcontaining all four conditions
was statistically signiﬁcant [F(3,105) = 7.71, p < 0.001, r = 0.26;
see Figure 3]. To test critical comparison 2, a pairwise comparison
was made between the RTs of same-response (M = 606.21 ms,
SE = 16.36) and non-response set (M = 632.48ms, SE = 16.39)
trials. The difference was statistically signiﬁcant [t(35) = 3.49,
p = 0.001, r = 0.51]. This indicated that the non-response set
condition had slower RTs than the same-response condition and is
supportive of thenotion that same-response trials involve response
facilitation. However, the pattern of RTs observed encouraged
the comparison of the different-response (M = 618.83 ms,
SE = 14.25) and non-response set trials; a comparison which
yielded [t(35) = 1.74, p = 0.091, r = 0.28]. Slower (but statis-
tically non-signiﬁcant) RTs to non-response set trials compared
to different-response trials was unexpected and makes the differ-
ence between same-response and non-response trials difﬁcult to
interpret.
Since neutral and same-response trials were used in this block,
we compared RTs to these trials to see if the same pattern of results
from critical comparison 1 of Experiment 2A would be replicated.
Using the same criteria employed to calculate the Bayes Factor
in Experiment 2A, the non-signiﬁcant [t(35) = 1.07, p = 0.294,
r = 0.18] difference between the two conditions returned a Bayes
Factor of 0.58 a value that cannot be taken as evidence for nor
against the theory under test (Dienes, 2011) and is therefore not
considered further.
The error rates for the neutral, same-response, different-
response and non-response trials were 5.8, 4.7, 7.2 and 3.9%
respectively. Analysis of the error rates showed a signiﬁcant differ-
ence in the omnibus one-wayANOVA [F(3,105)= 3.40, p= 0.021,
r = 0.18]. Post hoc pairwise comparisons between the condi-
tions yielded a signiﬁcant difference between different-response
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and non-response trials [t(35) = 3.31, p = 0.012, r = 0.49] while
the other comparisons were non-signiﬁcant (ps> 0.05). The error
rate for different-response trials in the present experiment is much
higher than in Experiment 2A [t(35) = 2.03, p = 0.050, r = 0.33],
but was only statistically different from the non-response set trials
which is largely consistent with the previous block in that errors
were no different between different-response, same-response and
neutral trials. This is discussed further below.
It is also possible that the introduction of non-response tri-
als inﬂuence participants’ approach to different-response trials in
Experiment 2B since the number of incongruent trials increases.
Pairwise comparisons between the RTs and error rates of different-
response trials in the two experiments were run. The results were
inconclusive as although the error rates in Experiment 2B were
higher the RTs were non-signiﬁcantly different [t(35) = 1.56,
p = 0.125, r = 0.25].
DISCUSSION
The goal of the present study was to assess the utility of the
two-to-one mapping manipulation and the nature of same-
response incongruent trials in the Stroop task. This was assessed
by comparing them to non-color word neutral trials and non-
response set trials whilst controlling for response contingency.
The key result is the ﬁnding of strong (Bayesian) evidence
for no statistical difference between same-response and non-
color word neutral trials. As stated earlier, two possible sce-
narios could be the cause of this: either same-response trials
involve both response facilitation and semantic category com-
petition, with the two effects canceling each other out, or
the more parsimonious explanation that same-response trials
do not involve either effect. Although this result does not
allow us to draw conclusions about the mechanisms involved
in same-response trials, it shows clearly that same-response tri-
als do not permit a reliable measure of the presence or absence
of semantic category conﬂict and therefore all future studies
using the 2-to-1 mapping paradigm should include a neutral
baseline.
Same-response incongruent trials were also compared to non-
response set trials. Following the assumptions of the two-to-one
paradigm, these trials are thought to involve semantic cate-
gory conﬂict and not response conﬂict, just like same-response
trials, but in contrast to same-response trials are unlikely to
involve response facilitation. We found that non-response set
trials were responded to more slowly than same-response tri-
als. This result suggests that RTs to same-response trials are at
least partially determined by response facilitation. In light of
these results, the signiﬁcance of a series of recent studies might
have to be reassessed (Schmidt and Cheesman, 2005; van Veen
and Carter, 2005; Wendt et al., 2007; Steinhauser and Hub-
ner, 2009; Chen et al., 2011, 2013; Berggren and Derakshan,
2014).
However, the longer RT to non-response set trials has to be
interpreted with caution since we also observed unexpected results
when comparing non-response to different-response trials. RTs to
non-response set trials were not different from those to different-
response trials, which was not in line with predictions based on
previous research. However, recent work in our lab shows that
the putative response set effect (different-response trials – non-
response set trials) is strongly modulated by trial type mixing
and is thus not as reliable as previously thought. Hasshim and
Parris (submitted) have shown that the response set effect is much
larger when different-response and non-response set trials are pre-
sented in different, pure blocks. When presented in mixed blocks
the response set effect was substantially reduced; an effect that
resulted froma substantial decrease inRT to different-response tri-
als, whilst no other trial type was affected. Thus, since the present
results mirror effects observed in Hasshim and Parris, it is likely
that trial type mixing employed here is responsible for the lack
of the expected response set effect. Moreover, this means that the
RTs observed to the non-response set trials are reliable. Indeed
a few studies have reported no difference between non-response
and different-response trials under similar mixed conditions (but
slightly different presentation formats; e.g., Stirling, 1979; Sugg
and McDonald, 1994; Milham et al., 2001). However, the error
data from Experiment 2B bear consideration at this point. Whilst
the number of errors did not differ from those in the neutral
or same-response condition, there were signiﬁcantly fewer errors
in the non-response set condition than in the different-response
condition. Assuming that the error trials are the trials on which
participants experienced the most difﬁculty, removing those tri-
als means you are potentially removing the trials that would
have increased the overall average RT for the different-response
condition, rendering them signiﬁcantly longer than those to non-
response trials andhence revealing the expected response set effect.
Nevertheless, this would not have altered the RTs to non-response
set trials. If anything the RTs to non-response set trials are lower
than they would have been had the more difﬁcult trials been
included. In sum, the results from Hasshim and Parris permit
us to conclude that the ﬁnding of shorter RTs to same-response
trials than to non-response set trials is best interpreted as sup-
porting the notion that same-response trials involve some form of
facilitation.
Whilst the present results are incompatible with multi-stage
models of Stroop interference (Klein, 1964; Zhang and Korn-
blum, 1998; Zhang et al., 1999; De Houwer, 2003; Schmidt and
Cheesman, 2005), some such models would predict that no differ-
ence should be expected between same-response and neutral trials
when participants respond manually because manual responses
(with color patches) do not have access to semantics (Glaser and
Glaser, 1989; Sugg and McDonald, 1994; Sharma and McKenna,
1998). Given the use of amanual responsewith color patches in the
present study our data are compatible with such models. However,
it is clearly not possible to have same-response trials when using
a vocal response, thus we restrict our interpretation to models
whose predictions are not modiﬁed by response modality.
In the present study we also controlled for response contin-
gency effects to ensure that such effects were not contributing
to the RTs on congruent and same-response trials. One surpris-
ing effect of controlling for response contingency was the lack
of Stroop facilitation effects (neutral-congruent RTs) when we
had observed Stroop facilitation when contingency was not con-
trolled inExperiment 1. ThemechanismbehindStroop facilitation
effects is debated (MacLeod and MacDonald, 2000; Kane and
Engle, 2003; Roelofs, 2010; Brown, 2011). Our study was not
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designed to make this comparison, but we are not aware of any
other study that has made a comparison between neutral and
congruent trials when contingency is, and is not, controlled. A
future study designed explicitly to test for effects of contingency
would beneﬁt from a within-subjects comparison to investigate
whether, once contingency is controlled, the resulting increase
in RTs to congruent trials leaves no facilitation effects to be
explained.
A further effect of controlling for contingency is that, in
the present data set at least, there was no difference between
same-response and congruent trials suggesting that any differ-
ence between these two trial types is largely driven by response
contingency and not semantic category conﬂict. More could
be made of this result had previous studies not observed a
semantic category conﬂict effect even after controlling for con-
tingency (De Houwer, 2003; Schmidt and Cheesman, 2005). The
present result then could be interpreted as showing no effect
of semantic category conﬂict due to unusually fast responses
on same-response trials; that is there is no difference between
same-response and congruent trials (and neutral trials) because
for whatever reason, semantic category conﬂict was absent from
Experiment 2 of the present study. However, it is not clear why
semantic category conﬂict would be absent in Experiment 2
but not Experiment 1. Furthermore, the RTs to same-response
trials in Experiment 1 and 2 are identical (∼600 ms). Con-
trolling for contingency was predicted to increase RTs to con-
gruent trials and indeed RTs to congruent trials increased by
∼30 ms when contingency was controlled. In short, despite
contrasting with previous results showing an effect of seman-
tic category conﬂict when contingency is controlled, the null
difference between congruent and same-response trials is most
likely an outcome of an increase in RTs to congruent trials
brought about by contingency. Notably, congruent trial RTs
are also not different from neutral trial RTs which in turn are
not different from same-response trial RTs. With the predicted
effect of contingency and a neutral word baseline that does
not involve semantic or response conﬂict the results are best
interpreted as showing that RTs to same-response trials can-
not be used reliably to determine the presence or absence of
semantic category conﬂict. All future studies should include a neu-
tral non-color word baseline when utilizing the 2-to-1 mapping
paradigm.
Since we had removed the effects of response contingency from
Experiment 2 we can be conﬁdent that the difference observed
between the same-response and different-response trials is not
overestimated. Indeed, a raw effect size of roughly 30 ms seems
to be a common magnitude of difference between these two
trial types whether contingency is controlled or not. However,
as mentioned earlier the utility of same-response trials in such
a comparison is questioned by the present results given they
are not reliably different from neutral trials. In essence, our
results suggest that the difference between different-response and
same-response trials in terms of RTs is the same as the dif-
ference between different-response and neutral trials, meaning
that it is a measure of Stroop interference and not a purer
measure of response conﬂict as has previously been assumed
(De Houwer, 2003; Schmidt and Cheesman, 2005; van Veen
and Carter, 2005; Steinhauser and Hubner, 2009). The analy-
ses on error rates also do not clearly explicate the differences
between the different conditions although the trend does sug-
gest a higher error rate for different-response trials generally,
which is to be expected. Previous studies using the Stroop
task typically do not focus on error rates because the rela-
tively easy task keeps speed-accuracy trade-off to a minimum.
Thus the analyses on RTs are the main focus of this paper as
well.
The sample size of the present study was selected to match
that of Schmidt and Cheesman (2005). However, Schmidt and
Cheesman do not report the gender of their participants and so
it was not possible to establish whether our participants differed
from theirs in that respect. Whilst unlikely it is possible that the
differences between our study and theirs (i.e., the effect of con-
tingency on the difference between same-response and congruent
trials) were a consequence of the gender differences in the present
study. However, we have no reason to assume that gender would
inﬂuence the present results. Nevertheless, future studies should
consider testing equal numbers of male and female participants to
eliminate this as a possible account of ﬁndings observed.
In conclusion, same-response trials cannot be used to deter-
mine the presence or absence of semantic category conﬂict, at least
until the mechanisms contributing to RTs are better understood.
Nor can they be used to index a purermeasure of response conﬂict.
Notably, the lack of difference between same-response and neutral
trials does not necessarily mean that the two trial types are pro-
cessed in a similar way. For example, van Veen and Carter (2005)
have shown that different brain regions are activated by same-
response and different-response trials when both are compared
to congruent trials. Whilst our data suggest that any differences
observed in previous studies between same-response and congru-
ent trials is likely just greater semantic/response facilitation effects
on the latter, it is possible that the competing inﬂuences of response
facilitation and semantic conﬂict interact to inﬂuence response
latency. Sometimes one might win over the other, producing evi-
dence for conﬂict or facilitation, but until it is known how latency
is modulated by each, or even that it actually occurs, RTs to same-
response trials must be interpreted with caution. The inability
to differentiate neutral and same-response trials is important and
reason enough to doubt the latters usefulness inmeasuring seman-
tic category conﬂict. Our results show that non-response set trials
are potentially a better alternative.
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